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Introduction
Modern macroeconomic theory has generally
characterized the link between the financial sec-
tor and macroeconomic activity as a monetary
phenomenon, focusing on the use of money as a
medium of exchange. However, positing money
as the key financial aggregate abstracts from the
credit flows taking place in the broader, sophisti-
cated financial markets of modern developed
economies.
In the last decade, there has been an increas-
ing macroeconomic interest in understanding
the relationship between the performance of the
broader financial sector and aggregate economic
activity. The notion that variation in the supply of
financial services may help explain real output
fluctuations has come to be known as the credit
view of the financial transmission mechanism.
This view posits that the relationship of these
services to economic activity is not completely
captured in monetary aggregates. The interest in
developing a credit view as opposed to a mone-
tary view is coincident with the dramatic changes
taking place in the financial services industry and
with the breakdown of the conventional money-
income relationships.
A credit view of the link between financial
flows and real economic activity is not new,
however. It is fundamental in Irving Fisher's
(1933) analysis of the Great Depression, in
which he explained how the effect of deflation
on borrowers' solvency contributed to the sever-
ity of the economic contraction. Bemanke (1983)
interpreted and tested a credit view of the impact
of financial distress in his well-known empirical
study of the Great Depression. In discussing the
importance of the performance of the financial
sector for economic activity, he argues:
...economic institutions, rather than being a "veil,"
can affect costs of transactions and thus market
opportunities and allocations. Institutions which
evolve and perform well in normal times may
become counterproductive during periods when
exogenous shocks or policy mistakes drive the
economy off course, (p. 257)
Recent literature exploring the microfounda-
tions of credit markets explains how financial
markets matter in channeling an economy's flow
of funds to current investment opportunities.
1 In
this literature, the most common source of
demand for financial services arises from infor-
mational asymmetries. Investors with financial
capital do not have good information about the
• 1 Examples of current work in this area are summarized in Gertler (1988).
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ment opportunities. The specific characteristics
of financial contracts and financial institutions
reflect ways of solving these information prob-
lems. Optimal financial contracts and institutions
minimize the resource costs associated with
producing information for investors and moni-
toring the activities of entrepreneurs.
Economic activity is dependent on the smooth
operation of this financial structure. Changes in
the cost of supplying credit-market services can
affect investment expenditures and output; thus,
financial sector performance can feed back to the
real sector and exacerbate output fluctuations.
However, empirical tests of the credit view in
the modern U.S. economy have yielded mixed
results (King [1985], Bernanke [1986]). Gertler
(1988) notes that these results may reflect the
identification problems inherent in estimating
reduced-form macroeconomic relationships.
Alternatively, the mixed results may be because
the credit disruption channel, identified by Ber-
nanke, has not been captured in the credit prox-
ies used in this empirical work.
Depression-era studies suggest that when
financial institutions are performing well, their
operation is inconspicuous. When credit rela-
tionships are disrupted, however, economic
activity is notably affected. Thus, it is not the flow
of good credit, but the disruption of the system
due to bad credit that underlies the credit trans-
mission mechanism.
This paper investigates the credit view in the
modern British economy. Great Britain represents
an interesting alternative to the modern United
States as a testing ground for the credit view
because of the way it handles bad credit cases—
insolvencies by debtors. Its goal in resolving
insolvencies is to recover creditors' funds; the
mode of resolution is primarily liquidation. In
contrast, U.S. laws promote the rehabilitation of
insolvent debtors, which encourages reorganiza-
tion of the insolvent entity and avoids the shut-
ting down of operations. Thus, insolvencies in
Great Britain are more likely to disrupt existing
credit relationships because the insolvent enti-
ties generally liquidate.
Using British insolvency data, this paper pre-
sents evidence favoring a "credit disruption"
interpretation of the link between financial fail-
ure and real economic activity. Borrowers' insol-
vencies explain a portion of the variation in real
output not explained by variations in monetary
aggregates or past real output. This suggests that
insolvencies associated with liquidation are a
channel by which financial market performance
can feed back and affect economic activity. Liq-
uidations affect economic activity negatively, as
they are costly to resolve and disrupt future
credit flows to investment opportunities.
The methodology employed here follows
Bemanke's (1983) study of the Great Depression
in the United States. The tests find that the
volume of insolvencies contributes significantly
in explaining output fluctuations in Great Britain
between 1964 and 1987. Insolvencies are nega-
tively related to output, controlling for monetary
conditions and lagged economic activity.
In section I, this study is related to two empir-
ical studies of the Great Depression in describ-
ing the credit view tested here and the method-
ology used to conduct the investigation. In
comparing the modern British economy with
those considered in other studies, we are com-
paring economies that may differ in both politi-
cal economy and production possibilities. The
advantages of using Great Britain as a testing
ground for the credit view are discussed in the
context of cross-economy comparisons. Section
II presents the regression specifications and
estimation results, and section III concludes.
I. Identifying a Financial
Transmission Mechanism
Previous Studies
The tests for a financial transmission mechanism
presented here are most closely related to two
previous empirical studies by Bernanke (1983)
and Haubrich (1989). These studies test for a
credit channel in explaining the severity of the
Great Depression in the United States and Can-
ada, respectively. The methodology these authors
employ essentially involves including measures
of financial-market performance as explanatory
factors in a reduced-form monetary model.
In his empirical investigation, Bernanke uses
information about the liabilities of failed banks
and failed nonbank firms to explain real output
in a Barro-type monetary model.
2 Bernanke con-
cludes that the loss of financial services resulting
from bank failures made the economic downturn
longer and more severe than would be predicted
by looking only at the monetary contraction.
Haubrich's (1989) study of the Canadian
experience during the Great Depression pro-
vides less support for a broad interpretation of
• 2 This type of model embodies the rational expectations "money view"




Best available copythe credit view. He uses changes in the number
of bank branches (rather than failed banks' liabil-
ities) to measure contraction of intermediation
services in Canada during the 1930s. The results
indicate that changes in the scale of banking
activity through branching were insignificant in
explaining output when controlling for monetary
factors and lagged output.
The market structure of the Canadian banking
industry, which was highly concentrated with
extensive branching, may explain these results.
The Canadian banking crisis of the 1930s, unlike
that of the United States, was not characterized
by extensive bank failures: Credit problems were
dealt with by bank reorganization rather than
bank liquidation. Thus, Haubrich finds that the
reduction in financial services associated with
bank-branch consolidation did not significantly
affect output.
Both of these studies focus on banks and their
role in creating a primary market for certain bor-
rowers during the 1930s. Both studies are con-
sistent with the notion that the credit-market dis-
ruptions associated with borrower debt default
and liquidation are the channel by which
financial-market performance can exert an effect
on economic activity.
Why Study the Modern
British Economy?
Like the Depression-era studies, tests of the
credit view in the modern U.S. economy have
emphasized indirect credit flows through bank
lending in measuring the performance of the
financial sector. King (1985) and Bernanke
(1986) use various types of bank loans in vector
autoregressions explaining output that yielded
inconclusive evidence about the credit view in
the modern U.S. economy. The mixed results of
these tests suggest that bank loans may be a
poor proxy for the credit-disruption channel
identified by Bernanke.
The mixed evidence of a "bank lending"
financial transmission mechanism is perhaps not
surprising given the nature of the modern U.S.
financial sector. In the last two decades, financial
markets have evolved dramatically. Nonbank
institutions have developed to compete with the
traditional banking sector in supplying external
finance to borrowers. The traditional banking
sector now plays a less significant role in chan-
neling funds to primary borrowers than in pre-
vious decades. Also, the modern U.S. financial
system operates over a large safety net of
government policies, which includes a "too-big-
to-let-fair bailout policy toward troubled deposi-
tory institutions. These factors imply that the
modern financial transmission mechanism is dif-
ferent from that of the 1930s.
The British banking industry has long had a
relatively concentrated market structure utilizing
extensive branching, with the Bank of England
acting as lender of last resort and providing over-
sight for all deposit-taking institutions.
3 Few Brit-
ish banks have failed. In the last two decades, the
British financial sector, like its U.S. counterpart,
has evolved so that the traditional banking sector
now facilitates a smaller share of the flow of
funds than in earlier decades (Bank of England
[1985]).
While these factors would seem to rule against
a test of the credit view in Great Britain, there is
an important difference between the United
Kingdom and the United States: The two nations
differ in how they deal with insolvent borrowers.
In Great Britain, the goal in resolving an insol-
vency is primarily the recovery of creditors'
funds; the mode of resolution is primarily liqui-
dation. Upon the petition of creditors, an insol-
vent entity is usually placed into receivership
and liquidated to meet the creditors' claims. This
involves the dissolution of the entity and some
degree of default on its liabilities. The United
States, on the other hand, has a tolerance for
bankruptcy and a tradition of reorganization
rather than liquidation.
4 Thus, insolvency in
Great Britain has been associated with a greater
degree of disruption of existing credit-market
relationships—the credit channel emphasized by
Bernanke.
This study uses both noncorporate and corpo-
rate insolvencies in Great Britain to test whether
the ill health of primary borrowers in the finan-
cial sector can help explain variations in real
output, in addition to monetary conditions. The
volume of British insolvencies should negatively
affect economic activity, as liquidation is costly
both in resolution and in the disruption of credit
flows to real investment opportunities.
• 3 The importance of the central bank's backing is most dramatically
demonstrated by the limited nature of banking crises given the government's
minimal provision of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance has only recently
been promoted by British government policymakers and offers a relatively
small degree of coverage. During the Secondary Banking Crisis of the early
1970s, secondary banks, which include other deposit-taking institutions, were
bailed out by the Bank of England (see Bank of England [1978]). For a further
description of the British banking sector, see Bank of England (1985) and Poz-
dena and Hotti (1985).
• 4 See "Bankruptcy Law," The Economist, February 24,1990, pp. 77-78.
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indirect credit channel of bank lending, it is con-
sistent with the credit view that the health of
financial firms matters to financial-market per-
formance. Even if they do not themselves fail,
financial intermediaries are an important conduit
of the credit-disruption channel for two reasons.
First, bad loans affect the health of bank balance
sheets, by reducing their internal capital. This
may affect the characteristics of future credit
extended and the use of intermediation tech-
nology in making new loans. Second, liquidation
of insolvencies abrogates existing credit relation-
ships, so that banks must expend resources in
seeking out new investment opportunities.
Insolvencies in Great
Britain
The measure of credit failures used in this study
is the number of insolvency cases in the British
economy. The legal definition of insolvency is
that a borrower cannot pay its liabilities to its
creditors when due; that is, the borrower is in
default on the promised flow of debt service.
The important feature of insolvencies in Great
Britain is that the existing management is
replaced and the insolvent entity is liquidated.
Bankruptcies include the cases of insolvent
persons and partnerships handled under bank-
ruptcy acts. When a noncorporate borrower is
insolvent, the bankruptcy of the estate may be
acknowledged voluntarily or determined in the
courts. A creditor petitions the courts to place a
receiving order against a debtor, which places
his estate into the receivership of an officer of
the court. The court makes a receiving order
only when it is satisfied that the debtor has
committed an act of bankruptcy. Alternatively,
creditors and debtors may resolve a bankruptcy
without recourse to the courts.
5
Cases of insolvent incorporated entities, which
are said to go into liquidation, are included in
the series called company liquidations; these
insolvencies may be settled in or out of court, as
well. Compulsory liquidations are settled by court
orders upon petition, and voluntary liquidations
are resolved without court proceedings. The
insolvency series do not include companies that
choose to liquidate for reasons other than
insolvency.
6
The insolvency series, compiled by the
Department of Trade and Industry, are originally
published in British business periodicals. These
series capture failures of financial firms as well as
those of nonfinancial firms and individuals.
7
Other studies have generally used financial
aggregates to measure financial-market perform-
ance; however, the number of credit relation-
ships is also important when there are fixed
costs to establishing such a relationship. To
interpret the link between insolvency and eco-
nomic activity as a credit channel, it would be
best to consider both the number of insolvency
cases and the financial flows involved (the liabil-
ities and assets of insolvent entities).
Unfortunately, only data on the numbers of
insolvency cases are published quarterly. Data on
the assets and liabilities involved in corporate
insolvencies are not published. However, statis-
tics on the assets and liabilities involved in bank-
ruptcies settled by receiving orders and deeds of
arrangement are available in annual data series.
8
These series indicate that the number of bank-
ruptcy cases is positively correlated with the
volume of bankrupts' liabilities and with the
severity of the insolvencies.
Figure 1 shows the annual number of bank-
ruptcies and the annual volume of liabilities
associated with these cases in constant pounds-
sterling. The two series track each other relatively
well, although 1978 is an obvious exception: In
this year, the average size of liabilities involved
in a bankruptcy claim was unusually large.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between
the annual number of bankruptcy cases and the
inverse of the ratio of bankrupts' assets to liabili-
ties. Because a low asset/liability ratio indicates a
more severe default, the latter series is positively
related to the severity of the insolvency cases.
The two series indicate that an increase in the
number of bankruptcies is associated with a
• 5 Bankruptcies liquidated without recourse to the courts are called deeds
of arrangement. Deeds of arrangement comprise only about 1 percent of the
number of court-settled bankruptcy cases. Both types of case resolution are
included in the bankruptcy series used in the subsequent empirical tests.
• 6 These cases are called members' voluntary liquidations.
• 7 Bemanke included both failed nonbank liabilities and failed bank liabili-
ties, which reflect the failed contracts with primary borrowers and with bank
depositors, respectively. The joint significance of these series could be inter-
preted as evidence that the production of services associated with each layer
of financial contracting is significant.




U R E 1
Number of Bankruptciis
vs. Bankrupts' Liibilitiis
higher degree of default on noncorporate bor-
rowers' liabilities. This dimension of financial
distress is not captured by looking at the volume
of bankrupts' liabilities alone.
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various issues.
This section presents the empirical tests of the
insolvency and liquidation interpretation of the
credit view. These tests are most closely related
to the empirical studies by Bemanke (1983) and
Haubrich(1989).
A basic reduced-form monetary model was
estimated, regressing some measure of real gross
domestic product (RGDP) on its own lagged
values and on lags of the monetary aggregate
Ml, which serves as the transaction medium.
Lagged values of the insolvency series were then
added to the basic monetary specification equa-
tion to test whether they made a significant con-




Because we are testing whether insolvencies
resolved by liquidation can help explain output
fluctuations, it is important to establish that
insolvencies are not merely a reflection of fluc-
tuations in output or in monetary policy. Both
corporate and noncorporate insolvencies are dealt
with when the legal criterion of insolvency is
met and involve the settlement of the claims in
• 9 The series for gross domestic product from 1964 to 1983 are from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) 1983 Sum-
mary of Monthly Economic Statistics. The RGDP series from 1984 to 1986 are
from various issues of the OECD's Main Economic Indicators. The monetary
aggregate used here is the Bank of England's definition of Ml, which includes
currency in circulation plus sight deposits at reporting institutions in the mone-
tary sector. The M1 series was obtained from the Central Statistical Office's
(CSO) monthly publication Financial Statistics. For a discussion of the M1
series, see Central Statistical Office (1987). The numbers of bankruptcies and
corporate liquidations in England and Wales were obtained from the CSO pub-
lication Economic Trends (1975), for the years 1964 to 1975. The insolvency
series for the years 1975 to 1986 were obtained from vanous issues of the
CSO monthly publication Financial Statistics. We later discuss and present
tests of whether the ex ante choice of legal liability (corporate versus noncor-
porate) and the ex post choice of legal resolution (in or out of court) signifi-
cantly differ in their relationship to economic activity.
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a. Specification: constant, time trend, four lags of log-levels.




0 Thus, these settlements are not made
based on expected future conditions and do not
include liquidations made for other reasons.
Granger-causality tests on the variables included
in the regressions indicate that corporate liquida-
tions are bidirectionally related to Ml and RGDP
(see table 1). To control for the simultaneous
relationships indicated in the Granger-causality
tests, all of the regressions include equivalent lags
of real output, Ml, and the insolvency series. Also,
all specifications are estimated with and without
contemporaneous values of the explanatory vari-
ables.
1
1 The results are similar, so only those
specifications without contemporaneous values
of explanatory variables are presented here.
Alternative Reduced-Form
Specifications
The test procedure does not attempt to resolve
current macroeconomic debates about how
money affects real output; nor does it attempt to
take a stand on the issue of deterministic versus
stochastic trends in macroeconomic variables.
• 10 For further information and an analysis of these series, see CSO
(1975, 1987), and British Business (1980).
• 11 Bemanke included contemporaneous values of money growth and
failed liabilities, assuming they were unrelated to innovations in output.
Thus, several reduced-form models were esti-
mated using total or unanticipated monetary
aggregates, and log-levels or log-differences of
macroeconomic time series.
1
2 For brevity, we
discuss the results of two reduced-form models
that are comparable to the specifications used by
Bernanke and Haubrich; these models explain
the detrended level of RGDP with the log-




Model one follows Bernanke in defining out-
put as RGDP relative to an exponential trend. It
explains detrended RGDP with four lagged quar-
ters of detrended RGDP, Ml growth, and the
growth rates of bankruptcies and liquidations.
Although Bernanke was explaining output relative
to trend, he posited the growth rates of both
money and debt-default variables as the relevant
financial variables. We estimated this model using
total money growth and unanticipated money
growth, alternatively.
Model two follows Haubrich and estimates a
• 12 The estimation of the unanticipated nominal series follows Bernanke.
He constructed the unanticipated growth rate of Ml as the residuals from a
regression of the growth rate of M1 on four lagged growth rates of Ml, prices,
and output. Haubrich's empirical specifications included lags of the monetary
aggregate Ml.
• 13 The third model estimated used the total growth rate of RGDP as the
measure of real output. This model included four lagged quarters of the growth
rates of RGDP, M1, and the insolvency series in the various specifications
estimated. For brevity, these estimation results are not presented here.
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model attempts to explain RGDP relative to
exponential trend with four lagged quarters of
detrended RGDP, and the log-levels of Ml, bank-





The estimation results for model one using total
Ml growth found that both money and insolven-
cies explained output, controlling for the effect
of lagged output. These results are presented in
table IP
The basic monetary model estimated was
(1.1) DGDP= ^/SjO' )DGDP(-i
4
(=1
where DGDP(-i ) and DMl(-i ) are the /th-
lagged values of the exponentially detrended log
of RGDP and the growth rate of Ml, respectively.
The results for the basic monetary model are
presented in column one of table 2. Lagged out-
put explains most of the current behavior of
output relative to trend, but Ml growth is signifi-
cant as well, although the sum of the lag coeffi-
cients is both small in magnitude and negative.
Disaggregating Insolvencies
by Legal Liability
In specification 2 for model one, the growth
rates of bankruptcies and of total liquidations
• 14 The regressions were estimated using the statistical package Regres-
sion Analysis and Time Series (RATS) and using the RATS procedure called
ROBUSTERRORS to correct for autocorrelation evident in regressions esti-
mated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
• 15 The estimation results for model one using unanticipated money con-
trasted strikingly with those of Bernanke's Depression-era study. The lagged
growth rates of unanticipated money were not significant in explaining real
output. The growth rates of lagged insolvencies had the posited negative rela-
tionship to current output, but it was smaller in absolute magnitude and statis-
tically less significant than in the total money model. Insolvencies were margi-
nally significant in several regressions that used shorter lags of the insolvency
variables. For brevity, these results are not presented. For an analysis of the
debate about the alternative monetary models, see Mishkin (1982).
were included as measures of the financial dis-
tress of noncorporate and corporate borrowers,
respectively:
(1.2) DGDP = X P,(i )DGDP(-i )
TTjC/ )DBankrupt (-/ )
X(/ )DLiquid (-i ) + e.
Column 2 of table 2 indicates that the sum of
the lag-coefficients is negative and significantly
different from zero for both types of insolven-
cies; these results represent evidence in favor of
the credit-disruption interpretation of the credit
channel, although the relative magnitude of the
insolvency effect is small.
Disaggregating total insolvencies as noncorpo-
rate and corporate distinguishes between insol-
vent borrowers by their ex ante choice of legal
liability. Noncorporate insolvencies, categorized
as bankrupt individuals and partnerships, repre-
sent a class of borrowers Bemanke identifies as
those being most likely to rely on indirect credit
markets for external finance. There are larger
information costs associated with extending
credit to small, risky borrowers relative to the
size of the loans.
The null hypothesis that the effects of bank-
ruptcies and liquidations are equal could not be
rejected in model one. While we do not have
statistical evidence that bankruptcies and liquida-
tions have different effects on output, there
should be some differences.
Bankruptcies would be expected to be more
costly per British pound-sterling of the claims
involved because 1) most of the noncorporate
bankruptcies are settled in court and 2) upon
abrogation of credit relationships, it is more costly
to establish new credit relationships with this
class of borrowers. However, noncorporate
bankruptcies involve a smaller volume of liabili-
ties per claim. While they may have a higher
"bang per buck" in terms of the per-pound-
sterling default costs, these costs are obscured
when measuring credit disruption with the
number of insolvency cases. Thus, one reason
the effects by type of borrower are not signifi-
cantly different may be that the smaller size of
noncorporate borrowers' claims offsets the higher
relative costs of their bankruptcies in terms of
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1990 Q 2
Best available copyModal Ona Regression Rasults:
Simpli Period 1965-1987
Dependant Variable: Detrended R6DP



















F-Test: All Insolvency Lags = 0
a. Significant at the 1 percent level.
b. Significant at the 5 percent level.












































































































































































Best available copyexplicit costs and future leveraged expenditures.
1
6
A consideration that would compromise this
interpretation of relative insolvency costs is that
the ex ante choice of noncorporate legal liability
may reflect smaller potential default losses. Thus,
tests using a richer data series on insolvent bor-
rowers by type of legal liability are necessary to
verify further the relationship between insol-
vents' legal liability and credit disruption.
Disaggregating Liquidations
by Type of Case Resolution
In a third specification for model one, corporate
liquidations were disaggregated by whether they
were settled out of court (voluntary liquidations)
or in court (compulsory liquidations) in the
reduced-form specification for output. Column 3
in table 2 shows that the lag-coefficient sums are
comparable to regression 1.2 and that the insol-
vency variables remain jointly significant.
The disaggregation of corporate liquidations
represents a test of the hypothesis that the feed-
back from insolvencies to output will differ by
the way in which insolvencies are resolved.
1
7 The
decision of how to settle a default depends on
such factors as the size of the claim and the ex
post degree of default by corporate borrowers and
thus may reflect differences in the costs of the
insolvencies related to their mode of resolution.
The resolution of insolvencies is affected by
(and thus may be an indicator of) lenders' per-
ceptions of the degree of default, given an
informational asymmetry between borrower and
lender. Voluntary liquidations may therefore sig-
nal a default with less net return to the claimants
and could indicate a more serious degree of
default. Because a corporate borrower has limited
liability, if lenders expect to get no return from
litigation, the lower cost of an out-of-court set-
tlement may be in their interest. Compulsory
liquidations would, therefore, reflect the more
marginal cases of insolvency. A creditor is more
likely to litigate his liability if he believes that the
actual degree of default is less than the debtor
asserts (given the lender's monitoring costs).
This interpretation suggests that voluntary liqui-
dations may have a larger default-cost impact on
output than do compulsory liquidations.
Some factors mitigate this interpretation of
these series, however. Incourt resolutions are
more costly than out-of-court resolutions, all else
being equal. In addition, compulsory liquida-
tions would have a greater effect on output if
larger claims are more likely to be litigated; this
effect would be related to the volume of liabili-
ties involved. The litigation of large cases could
be explained by the fixed costs of court resolu-
tion. Also, given an informational asymmetry
(between creditors and debtors), random litiga-
tion may be in the lenders' interest as a response
to adverse selection.
1
8 This would increase the
incidence of compulsory liquidation as an indi-
cator of potential default losses as related to the
size of the claim. These factors obscure how the
effects of the disaggregated series should differ
quantitatively.
A test of the hypothesis that the quantitative
effects of the disaggregated liquidation series are
equal was not rejected. This result is consistent
with the resolution of insolvencies as being an
indicator of both the creditors' perceptions of
the degree of default as well as the size of the
claims (hence the potential gains from litiga-
tion). The insignificance of the choice of case
resolution for output may indicate that voluntary
liquidations signal more serious defaults, while




The estimation specification for model two used
the log-levels (rather than the growth rates) of
Ml and of insolvencies as explanatory variables.
These regression results are presented in table 3.
The basic monetary specification estimated for
model two was
(2.1)
• 16 Alternatively, the total resource costs associated with an insolvency
should be negatively related to output (as in Bemanke's study). In this sense,
larger corporate liquidations are more costly, which is consistent with these
empirical results.
• 17 Bernanke emphasized that small borrowers (but not large borrowers)
were credit-constrained.
• 18 Random monitoring has been considered by Diamond (1984) and
Moore (1987) as a means of evoking truthful reporting and minimizing the
resource costs of informational asymmetries.
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lagged values of the exponentially detrended
RGDP and the log of Ml, respectively. The
results for the basic monetary model in column
one of table 3 indicate that, again, lagged output
significantly explains most of the current behav-
ior of output relative to trend. In this regression,
the coefficient sum is now positive, but small.
1
9
tions) or in court (compulsory liquidations) in
the reduced-form specification for output.
Column 3 in table 3 shows that although the lag-
coefficient sums are comparable to regression
2.2, the significance of the financial variables was
reduced. As in model one, the hypothesis test
that the quantitative effects of the disaggregated
liquidation series are equal was not rejected.
Disaggregating Insolvencies
by Choice of Legal Liability
In specification 2 for model two, the log-levels of
bankruptcies and of total liquidations were
included as measures of the financial distress of
noncorporate and corporate borrowers,
respectively:
(2.2) DGDP = £/?2(i )DGDP(-i )
TT2(/ ^Bankrupt (-i)
T2(i ^liquid {-i) + e.
The first hypothesis tested is that the log-levels
of bankruptcies and of corporate liquidations are
significantly different from zero. The second
column in table 3 indicates that the sum of the
lag-coefficients is negative and significantly
different from zero for bankruptcies, although
smaller in both magnitude and significance than
in model one. A hypothesis test equating the
quantitative effects of bankruptcies and liquida-
tions could not be rejected. Thus, as in model
one, the effects of the of ex ante choice of legal
liability by insolvent borrowers (noncorporate or
corporate) did not significantly differ using these
series.
Disaggregating Liquidations
by Type of Case Resolution
In the third specification for model two, corpo-
rate liquidations are disaggregated by whether
they were settled out of court (voluntary liquida-
• 19 These results are similar to those for the log-level regressions in
Haubrich (1989).
III. Conclusion
This paper presents a set of experiments that
tests a particular interpretation of the credit view
linking financial-market performance to eco-
nomic activity. British insolvencies, which
involve liquidation, are used in tests of a credit-
disruption channel from the financial sector to
real output.
The proposition that the past insolvencies of
corporate and noncorporate borrowers help
explain current output was tested, controlling for
the past behavior of real output and monetary
conditions. The numbers of past insolvencies
had a negative and statistically significant effect
on output.
Interpreting the insolvency series as capturing
the disruption of credit relationships indicates
that nonmonetary financial channels to real out-
put should be considered; credit failures as prox-
ied by insolvencies exert their own effects on
future economic activity. This evidence is con-
sistent with the cost-of-credit channel empha-
sized in Bernanke's analysis of the Great Depres-
sion. Insolvencies affect output negatively by
consuming resources in their resolution and by
reducing the volume of internal capital available
as a basis for future leveraged expenditures.
These results suggest that one explanation for
lack of conclusive evidence about the financial
transmission mechanism in the postwar United
States may be related to our tradition of dealing
with bankruptcy through reorganization rather
than liquidation.
It is interesting to note that Great Britain passed
an Insolvency Act in 1986. This reform allows
British firms to petition the courts to put them
into "administration," whereby the firm continues
to operate under the management of a court-
appointed administrator while the insolvency is
resolved. With this legislation, the British legal
system is moving away from the tradition of liqui-
dation toward an alternative of reorganization—a
system more in the tradition of the United States.
Does the evidence that liquidations adversely
affect output imply that liquidations should be
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a. Significant at the 1 percent level.
b. Significant at the 10 percent level.
c. Significant at the 5 percent level.




Best available copybalance the costs of liquidation with its benefits.
One result in the literature about the micro-
foundations of financial markets is that liquida-
tion, as a contingency, is a characteristic of finan-
cial contracts that allows resources to be
allocated efficiently. Although a system that set-
tles insolvencies by liquidation may be disrup-
tive, it preserves the incentives for creditors to
monitor the performance of borrowers and thus
preserves the incentives for borrowers to per-
form well. And although liquidation involves the
death of the borrowing entity, it is part of the
contingent contract that creditors are promised
for accepting the default risk of their claims. Liq-
uidation of insolvent entities is beneficial to an
economy when the alternative is an inefficient
use of resources.
A corollary to the allocative role of liquida-
tions is that an economy's legal policies toward
insolvency affect the efficiency of liquidations.
Townsend (1979) shows how the debt contract
that minimizes the resource costs of resolution
stipulates that, in the event of a bad investment
outcome, creditors can realize the maximum
from the actual project's return. Thus, efficient
liquidation policies must preserve the integrity
of the seniority of claims and must protect credi-
tors from the possibly adverse actions of current
managers, whether the insolvency is resolved by
reorganization or liquidation. They also must
provide an efficient mechanism for deciding
how the insolvency should be resolved. For
example, it may be optimal to allow creditors to
decide whether liquidation would be more effi-
cient than rehabilitation.
This study raises the question of how facets of
legal organization may be related to insolvency
as a financial transmission mechanism. Although
further tests disaggregating British insolvencies
by legal liability and legal resolution yield neg-
ligible information about the debt-default chan-
nels, they provide a focal point for future empiri-
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Introduction
A small depository institution with a history of a
pronounced seasonal increase in loans relative
to deposits may borrow a substantial portion of
its projected excess from a Federal Reserve Bank
at the basic discount rate. In the aggregate, this
seasonal borrowing program provides only a
scant source of funds to the financial system,
within a framework that is essentially the same
as when the program was introduced in 1973-
Substantial growth of peak seasonal borrowing
in recent years, after a decade or more of signifi-
cant changes in financial market structure, sug-
gests the timeliness of reviewing the rationale for
the seasonal borrowing program. Furthermore,
review seems doubly important because varia-
tions in seasonal borrowing have been compli-
cating monetary policy implementation.
1
The purpose of this paper is threefold. The
first objective is to provide a brief description of
the program and its role in funding banks and
• 1 See Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee
for meetings indicated in table 2.
the banking system. The second is to investigate
the original rationale for the seasonal borrowing
program and to determine how changes in
financial market structure during the intervening
years may have affected that rationale. The third
objective is to explore the connection between
the seasonal borrowing program and monetary
policy implementation. To date, any potential
conflict with monetary policy has been avoided
by flexible policy implementation and technical
changes in the borrowed reserve index of
reserve restraint used to guide open market
operations. These responses do complicate pol-
icy implementation, but flexibility also elimi-
nates what has become a dubious advantage of
the borrowed reserve procedure when seasonal
borrowing is the dominant component of the
index of reserve restraint.
I. The Seasonal
Borrowing Program
The seasonal borrowing program was introduced
in 1973, an outgrowth of a Federal Reserve Task
Force recommendation contained in "Reappraisal
of the Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism," a
three-volume System report published in 1971.
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SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Svstem.
The stated purpose of the new program was to
assist "...those [member] banks that enjoy only
limited or indirect access to national money
markets and which have definable and relatively
substantial seasonal pressures."
2 The program is
one of three ongoing direct lending facilities
maintained by the Federal Reserve Banks, the
other two being programs for adjustment and
extended credit.
Adjustment credit is available overnight or for
a short period, and cannot be used by an institu-
tion more than occasionally. It is designed for
institutions unexpectedly short of needed funds
in circumstances that make it difficult or impos-
sible to obtain financing from normal market
sources, such as at the end of a day, when
markets are thin or closed. Loans must be collat-
eralized, and the rate charged is the familiar
basic discount rate.
Extended credit, on the other hand, may be
outstanding for many months. It is designed for
an institution in exceptional circumstances—one
working closely with or under the control of
supervisory authorities to resolve financial diffi-
culties that limit its access to normal market
2 Federal Reserve press release, April 12,1973.
sources of funds. Loans are fully collateralized,
and usually are made at a variable rate that is
above market rates and at least 50 basis points
above the basic discount rate.
Seasonal credit is designed to supply the pre-
dictable needs of healthy institutions that are
thought to be too small and isolated to have
access to sources of short-term credit compara-
ble to that of larger institutions. Maturities are tai-
lored to the pattern of an institution's seasonal
funding gap. To qualify, an institution normally
must have total deposits of less than $500 mil-
lion and must demonstrate a recurring pattern of
seasonal swings in the net availability of lend-
able funds, measured as total deposits minus
total loans. An institution qualifying for a sea-
sonal line must fund a portion of its seasonal
funding need, calculated as 2 percent of the first
$100 million of its deposits, 6 percent of the next
$100 million, and 10 percent of its deposits in
excess of $200 million. Loans must be collateral-
ized, and are made at the same basic discount
rate as is charged for adjustment credit.
Seasonal borrowing in the aggregate has dis-
played two regularities: a pronounced seasonal
pattern, and a response to the economic incentive
to borrow (see figure 1). The seasonal pattern
shows borrowing growing to a peak in the
summer and then falling away to a minimum in
the winter, with the peak being about five times
larger than the succeeding minimum in recent
years. The seasonal pattern is thought to reflect
an agricultural credit cycle, because most bor-
rowing banks are in agricultural regions of the
country.
At the same time, and sometimes overriding
the seasonal pattern, the total amount borrowed
seems to respond to the size of the spread
between market interest rates and the discount
rate charged for seasonal borrowing. For exam-
ple, market rates were lower than the discount
rate during 1975-76, and borrowing declined to
minimal levels. The 1975 and 1976 seasonal
peak monthly amounts of borrowing averaged
only 30 percent of peak levels during the
preceding two years. Again, in the four months
after April 1980, the federal funds rate moved
from about 400 basis points higher than the dis-
count rate to almost 200 basis points lower. At
the same time, seasonal borrowing declined in a
counterseasonal movement that brought it to the
second-lowest monthly level on record.
Reviewing past movements in seasonal bor-
rowing also suggests the relatively small scale
and limited role the program plays within the
banking and monetary system (see table 1).
Fewer than 5 percent of commercial banks were
borrowers in 1988, when aggregate borrowing
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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a. See footnote 3.
SOURCES: Melichar (1980), Timenes and Melichar (1973), and Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System.
was at its then-record high. This was most likely
a smaller percentage of the number of banks
potentially qualified to borrow than the 21 per-
cent of potentially qualified banks that borrowed
in 1979
3 Reflecting the small size of eligible
banks, as well as the low incidence of borrowers
among those banks eligible to borrow, seasonal
borrowing never has accounted for as much as 1




The market economy of the United States relies
heavily on the decisions of private owners of
resources, in response to market signals, to
determine how and what goods and services get
produced. All else being equal, if owners of
small banks were unable to earn a competitive
rate of return while meeting seasonal credit
demands in their chosen market areas, they
would be expected to turn their resources to
some alternative use. Their potential customers
would seek out other lenders to meet their
credit needs or, if unable to find satisfactory
accommodation elsewhere, they would likewise
be expected to turn their resources to some
alternative use. Subjecting the ongoing process
of resource management to this competitive
market discipline is the fundamental test for wise
resource allocation.
Government intervention in the operation of a
market rests on the political judgment that there
would be something unwise about the pure
market outcome. More than that, it can be
argued, evidence that the pure market outcome
is deficient must be sufficiently compelling to
accept the risk that tinkering will create new and
unforeseen distortions that are worse than the
original deficiency.
Financial market regulation is a familiar
example. The structure of financial markets in
the United States was influenced in basic ways
by regulations originating in legislation of the
1930s. More recently, legislation has been
reshaping that financial structure, with an
emphasis on deregulation. An important objec-
tive has been to reduce distortions emanating
from regulation in order to allow fuller reliance
on private decisions and market discipline in
determining the structure of financial markets,
including the number and size of depository
institutions and their geographical extent, prod-
uct lines, and pricing.
The seasonal borrowing program originated
during the 1960s as a result of concerns about
whether private financial markets were equipped
to finance the long-term capital needs of the agri-
cultural sector and, in that context, whether small
banks would have sufficient liquidity to meet sea-
sonal needs of agricultural borrowers.
4 Banks
had accumulated large portfolios of liquid assets
during the previous 30 years, including large
holdings of U.S. government securities acquired
during World War II. This meant that banks had
been able to fund even very large seasonal swings
in loans relative to deposits by selling liquid
assets, for which there was an active national
market accessible by the smallest of banks.
• 3 "Most likely" because the Monetary Control Act nearly doubled the
number of banks eligible to seek qualification by extending the program to
nonmember banks. Had the percentage of qualified banks actually borrowing
remained unchanged at 21 percent in 1988 and the number of qualified
member banks remained about the same, the implication would be that only
about 8.5 percent of 7,600 nonmember banks qualified for the program. This
seems so implausible—because nonmember banks tend to be smaller and
less urban than member banks—that the alternative conclusion seems most
likely. Only commercial banks are considered, even though other depository
institutions also gained access to the discount window through the Monetary
Control Act of 1980. Typically, the program is not used by these nonbanks
because credit is available from special industry lenders, such as the Federal
Home Loan Banks.
• 4 Melichar and Doll (1971).
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worked off by most banks. Those facing dispro-
portionately large seasonal funding needs either
would have had to retain disproportionately
large portfolios of low-yield liquid assets, on
average, or they would have had to rely on alter-
native markets in which to sell loans or purchase
funds if they were to meet seasonal needs.
Research findings in the 1960s suggested that
"...a significant proportion of banks [had] large
relative seasonal outflows of funds; that these
banks tend[ed] to be small, presumably with
limited access to financial markets that larger
banks could use to meet such pressures."
5
The presumption that the relevant small banks
had more limited access to financial markets than
did other banks was familiar during the late 1960s
and the early 1970s, when the seasonal borrow-
ing program was devised and put into place.
Small banks with disproportionately large sea-
sonal needs for funds were mostly rural banks in
agricultural areas where the "spatial allocation of
bank credit" through markets was thought to be
an imperfect means of attracting surplus funds
from other areas. The interbank market was
limited, except perhaps for overnight federal
funds and through the correspondent banking
system. Only recently had Regulation Q govern-
ing deposit-rate ceilings been relaxed, providing
large banks, at least, with new power to use
deposit rates on large certificates of deposit
(CDs) to attract funds. Correspondent banks
were seen as sometimes unreliable sources of
support, especially where their interests were in
competition with those of their respondents.
6
The seasonal borrowing program was designed
for small banks with large seasonal outflows of
funds and "limited access to financial markets."
7
When Federal Reserve Banks lend to these small
banks, the resulting increased stock of bank
reserves must be absorbed by equivalent Federal
Reserve open market sales in the government
securities market in order to maintain monetary
• 5 Melichar (1971), p. 95.
• 6 Modigliani (1971).
• 7 This was not a unanimous interpretation of the rationale at the outset.
It was not until 1980 that the Monetary Control Act removed membership in
the Federal Reserve System as an issue thought to be relevant to many Sys-
tem decisions. Prior to that, the seasonal borrowing program was available
only to member banks, and some perceived the basic motivation for the pro-
gram as an effort to "...offset the growing net tax [primarily of reserve
requirements] on member banks, thereby reducing their incentive to quit the
System" (Kane [1974], p. 846).
policy unchanged. In effect, the program provides
borrowing banks with a nonmarket, assured con-
duit to the money market. Eligibility depends on
the size of a bank and on the seasonality of its
loans relative to deposits, not on an explicit




Recent large aggregate amounts of seasonal bor-
rowing might be interpreted as prima facie evi-
dence that the original rationale for the program
remains compelling. However, this need not be
so. The number of borrowers remains low rela-
tive to the number that are likely to be qualified
to borrow, there is a clear rate incentive to bor-
row, and changes in financial market structure
since 1973 should be expected to have reduced
the need to rely on the program.
The number of banks taking advantage of the
seasonal borrowing program seems to have been
lower than expected from the outset of the pro-
gram. Initial estimates were that approximately
2,000 banks had substantial seasonal calls for
funds and that the vast majority of these had less
than $50 million in assets, implying that a large
number of banks might take advantage of the
new program.
8 However, only 205 banks actually
borrowed during the first (abbreviated) year of
the program, and only 155 of those were among
the 2,000 banks that had been identified as
potential users.
9
Although the number of borrowers had more
than doubled by 1979, borrowers still represented
only 21 percent of the banks potentially eligible
to use the program. In 1980, the number of
banks potentially eligible to borrow was substan-
tially augmented by the Monetary Control Act,
which opened the program to nonmember com-
mercial banks. As a result, the number of poten-
tially eligible institutions had probably about
doubled by 1988, although no systematic esti-
mate is available.
1
0 Despite the expanded pool
of potential borrowers, the number of actual
borrowers was only 40 percent greater than in
1979- In short, despite indications that size and
seasonality would qualify a few thousand banks
8 Federal Reserve press release, April 5,1973.
9 Timenes and Melichar (1973).
10 See footnote 3.
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evidence from actual use of the seasonal borrow-
ing program suggests that the competitive disad-
vantage of limited access never has been as
extensive as might have been supposed.
The perception that limited access has not
been widespread was reinforced by nationwide
experience with the Temporary Simplified Sea-
sonal Credit Program, which began in 1985. The
simplified program was made available to banks
with deposits of less than $200 million that had
an above-average concentration of farm loans
and a loan-to-deposit ratio of at least 55 percent
(initially 60 percent). Eligibility required no
detailed calculations showing a historical sea-
sonal pattern of need for funds.
A reported expectation was that total seasonal
borrowing might triple during the first year of
the simplified program, but the actual level of
seasonal borrowing remained below that of the
previous year.
1
1 In the three-year life of the sim-
plified program, borrowing never exceeded a
monthly average of $14 million, even during the
years of severe agricultural distress for which the
program was designed. Apparently, markets were
not failing to supply funds to agricultural banks,
although it may be that banks were not receiving
bankable loan requests from potential borrowers.
The fact remains, however, that some banks
do use the seasonal borrowing program. The
question, then, concerns the extent to which
their use provides evidence of limited access, for
typically there is a clear economic incentive to
use the program.
1
2 The program represents a
"good deal" when the discount rate is lower
than market rates. If banks borrow in response to
the favorable rate spread, the implication is that
they find market sources of funds, or do not
lend, when the rate spread is less favorable;
expected profit, not limited access, generates use
of the program.
The two periods of pronounced minimal use
(1975-76 and 1980) also were the only sustained
periods since 1973 during which the discount
rate actually was higher than the federal funds
rate. But there is a counterargument: These also
• 11 Wall Street Journal, March 11, 1985.
• 12 A related question is not addressed here. As indicated in table 1, the
number of banks and percent of all commercial banks borrowing have
increased over the life of the program. Some banks truly may have the "need"
for seasonal borrowing as envisioned in the program, but it is not clear how
heavily the needs of a few borrowers should be allowed to weigh in providing
a special program.
were periods of loose monetary policy, in which
correspondent banks might have been expected
to service smaller banks with seasonal needs
because correspondents did not have better
alternatives in the money and loan markets. That
is, limited access would not occur unless mone-
tary policy were restrictive.
1
3
The restrictiveness of monetary policy, how-
ever, is not an either/or matter, and the rate
spread is not necessarily an indicator of policy
restraint. Restrictive policy refers jointly to a
restrained supply of base money (relative to
demand) and to the high federal funds rate
required to equilibrate the market for base
money. The supply of base money could be
quite restrictive, even with no borrowing, if the
discount rate were high relative to the high fed-
eral funds rate, choking off the demand for bor-
rowing. Under these circumstances, the supply
of base money would include a large proportion
of nonborrowed reserves and few borrowed
reserves. Alternatively, the same degree of
restraint could be achieved with fewer nonbor-
rowed reserves and correspondingly more bor-
rowing if the discount rate were far below a very
high federal funds rate, accommodating a large
demand for borrowing.
The rate spread simply measures the cost
advantage of discount borrowing, including the
cost advantage of using the seasonal borrowing
program, and there is evidence of a consistent
positive relationship between the aggregate
amount of seasonal borrowing and the rate
spread. Econometric estimates of the demand for
seasonal borrowing for the period 1984-88 find
that the rate spread was a statistically significant
explanatory variable (see box 1). Thus, at least
some of the actual seasonal borrowing may not
reflect borrowers' limited access to financial
markets, but simply the fact that size and season-
ality make the borrowers eligible for the attrac-
tive interest rate available through the program.
Declining Relevance
of Limited Access
The evolution of financial market structure since
1973 makes limited access seem a more tenuous
rationale for the program now than originally. No
single dramatic development can be cited as
removing limits on small banks' access to finan-
cial markets for seasonal funding. Rather, an
13 Melichar (1971,1980) makes this argument.
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The equation below shows the estimated relationship
between seasonal borrowing and the spread between the
federal funds rate and discount rate, plus three variables cap-
turing temporary or permanent shifts in the relationship prior
to 1988. The demand for seasonal borrowing was not signifi-
cantly affected during the Continental Illinois period (June-

































Durbin-Watson statistic (adjusted for 0 gaps) = 0.2334
Sum of squared residuals = 630807
Standard error of the regression = 74.0626
F-statistic (4, 115) = 23.316
Significance level = 0.0 percent
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Svstem.
accumulation of a variety of market developments
has moderated the concern about limited access
to financial markets that provided the original
rationale for the seasonal borrowing program.
Developments in the federal funds market
itself should have reduced seasonal inflexibility.
By 1981, a year of peak participation in the funds
market, almost 85 percent of small U.S. banks
(with assets less than $300 million) were partici-
pants in the federal funds market on the selling
side, and 40 percent on the buying side. Although
most of the volume being sold undoubtedly
represents the upstream flow of balances from
smaller banks to their larger correspondent
banks, nonetheless, more than half of the small
purchasing banks were independent banks, the
category most likely to fit the limited-access
rationale behind the program.
1
4
Regulation Q, which set ceilings on deposit
interest rates, has been phased out completely.
The prohibition of explicit interest payments on
narrowly defined demand deposits is the only
remaining regulation that might constrain deposi-
tory institutions from setting rates competitive
enough to attract deposits away from the national
markets. Reliance on brokered deposits may be
inappropriate for small institutions from a super-
visory point of view, but widespread reliance on
term consumer CDs has strengthened the ability
of even the smallest of insured institutions to
attract and manage liabilities in competition with
other depository institutions and securities.
Within the banking industry, changes in
market structure have reduced the market isola-
tion that might have produced seasonal inflexi-
bility in the balance sheets of lending banks. The
proportion of independent banks fell by more
than half between 1973 and 1987, from 78 per-
cent to 32 percent of all banks. Absorption into
one-bank holding companies accounted for 27
percentage points of this decline, while the other
19 percentage points resulted from affiliation
with multibank holding companies.
1
5 Compared
to a correspondent relationship, affiliation with a
multibank holding company would increase the
seasonal flexibility of acquired banks through
improved access to federal funds, jumbo CDs,
and holding-company debt markets, as well as
through more assured profit-maximizing geo-
graphic distribution of funds.
Relevant changes in market structure are not
limited to those that directly affect small banks
with large seasonal pressures. When nonbank
lenders enter the credit markets, there may be
less basis for concern about the adequacy of
bank lending because potential borrowers can
be served by other lenders. Federal lending,
including that of the Federal Intermediate Credit
Banks, represented a modestly larger share of
the debt of the farm business sector in 1988 than
in 1973. However, the new federal "Farmer Mac"
program might provide an even better means of
offsetting any market deficiency that impedes
seasonal lending at small agricultural banks. The
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 established the
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or
Farmer Mac. This new federally chartered
instrumentality is designed to provide liquidity to
agricultural lenders by issuing guaranteed secur-
ities collateralized by farm mortgage loans, and by
• 14 Year-end Reports of Income and Condition, Federal Financial Institu-
tions Examination Council.
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market in agricultural mortgages. The secondary
market allows banks to sell loans rather than
finance them with seasonal borrowing, eliminat-
ing the need for the collateral required in dis-
count window lending.
In sum, the evolution of financial market struc-
ture since 1973 has been toward deregulation,
by removing constraints that once might have
limited the response of lenders to seasonal farm
credit demands. This serves to reinforce the
implications drawn from apparently limited use
of the seasonal borrowing program, and suggests
that the rationale for the program may not be as
compelling now as it might have seemed in 1973.
III. The Monetary Policy
Connection
Before the seasonal borrowing program was
introduced in 1973, background studies had
considered whether unforeseen changes in sea-
sonal borrowing might make the appropriate
amount of open market operations more difficult
to determine. On balance, the problem was not
expected to be serious.
Since the banks will be expected to negotiate their
seasonal borrowing needs with their Reserve Banks
over their full seasonal period insofar as is feasible,
the general timing and amount of reserve injec-
tions from this source should be fairly well defined
in advance....
So long as the business of the Nation's largest
banks is such that these banks are unlikely to meet
the terms of the regulation and therefore are pre-
vented from suddenly becoming seasonal borrow-
ers, the total dimensions and variability of sea-
sonal credit assistance at the discount window
should be well within a scope that can be handled




This original expectation about "total dimen-
sions and variability of seasonal credit" cannot
be faulted. Typically, the program has provided
less than half of 1 percent of total bank reserves.
Even in peak months, it has never produced
more than 0.85 percent of total reserves, or
about two-tenths of 1 percent of base money.
The problem, however, arises from the combina-
tion of even more modest "total dimensions...of
seasonal credit" than might have been antici-
pated and a different method of open market
operations than was foreseen when the program
was adopted.
In its broadest sense, monetary policy oper-
ates by controlling the stock of base money—
currency plus bank reserves—available to the
economy. Base money is the liability of Federal
Reserve Banks, consisting of Federal Reserve
notes plus Federal Reserve deposits owned by
depository institutions.
The stock of base money increases or decreases
when the Federal Reserve buys or sells Treasury
securities through domestic open market opera-
tions, as well as when Federal Reserve Banks
lend to or are repaid by depository institutions at
the discount window. This is because the
amounts purchased and loaned are added directly
to the deposit accounts of depository institutions,
just as sales and loan repayments are subtracted
directly from those accounts. Clearly, controlling
the stock of base money requires a procedure
for policy implementation that coordinates the
open market and discount window functions.
1
7
What was not foreseen in 1973 was that in
1982, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) would adopt a borrowed reserve
procedure for implementing monetary policy.
This involves specifying an objective for the level
of adjustment plus seasonal borrowing to be
achieved by the manager of the System Open
Market Account through open market operations
occurring between FOMC meetings. The man-
ager can achieve a borrowed reserve objective
because, by the end of a reserve maintenance
period, initial estimates are available of the
actual amount of reserve deposits that institu-
tions need to satisfy their reserve requirements.
In addition, demand for excess reserves can be
estimated with reasonable accuracy. Supplying
less than this combined need for reserves
through open market operations makes it neces-
sary for some combination of institutions to bor-
row the remainder at the discount window.
1
8
The borrowed reserve procedure is a way of
controlling the federal funds rate; the policy-
16 Holland and Garvy (1972), pp. 193-94.
• 17 At the direction of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve sometimes
intervenes in foreign exchange markets, buying or selling dollars. Controlling
the stock of base money also requires coordination of domestic open market
operations with these foreign exchange market operations.
• 18 Extended credit is not included in the borrowing target, but is treated
as a component of nonborrowed reserves. This means that increases in
extended credit are a substitute for open market purchases of securities in
carrying out open market operations.
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sistent with the policy-intended level of the fed-
eral funds rate. A higher borrowing objective,
generally described in the FOMC's policy direc-
tive as a higher "degree of reserve restraint,"
normally would be associated with a higher
expected spread of the federal funds rate above
the discount rate. This is because institutions are
reluctant to use their adjustment borrowing privi-
lege, lest it preclude borrowing in a future period
of greater (or more profitable) need. In the
attempt to avoid borrowing, institutions bid for
federal funds in the interbank market where they
buy and sell reserves, until the rate rises enough
to induce them to borrow the necessary amount
of reserves at the discount window. Similarly, at
higher market rates relative to the discount rate,
the seasonal borrowing option becomes more
attractive, adding to borrowed reserves.
Controlling the federal funds rate by controlling
borrowing depends on the existence of a predict-
able relationship between the amount of adjust-
ment plus seasonal borrowing and the average
spread of the funds rate above the discount rate.
Transitory variations in reserve demand and
supply may be associated with transitory varia-
tions in the federal funds rate; on average, how-
ever, the rate will be at the intended level. An
alternative way to control the rate would be by
frequent, perhaps small, open market purchases
and sales that would counteract transitory rate
pressures arising from fluctuations in demand
and supply, and that would signal to the market
when the funds rate is above or below the
policy-intended level.
With either procedure, transitory variations in
the funds rate would be damped to the extent
market participants had rather firm expectations
about the equilibrium level of the rate. Relative
to the alternative, the borrowed reserve proce-
dure relies more heavily on private market
adjustments in the funds rate to accommodate
transitory deviations of reserve demand and Sys-
tem supply from levels that, on average, are con-
sistent with monetary policy. The alternative
funds rate procedure would be more likely to
accommodate those transitory deviations
through open market operations.
1
9
The potential advantage of a borrowed reserve
procedure is in allowing changes in market per-
ceptions of basic money and credit demand to
feed into the reserves market and to cumulate in
funds rate movements without delay. A funds
rate procedure, on the other hand, would pre-
vent rate movements resulting from changes in
basic money and credit demand and would
delay balance sheet adjustments by depository
institutions. Only the frequency and direction of




A disadvantage of the borrowed reserve
procedure is that policy could become poorly
defined or communicated if the borrowing/
funds rate relationship shifts. An unexpected
shift will lead to some mix of persistent devia-
tions of the funds rate and borrowing from the
values intended by the FOMC, until this shift is
identified and the borrowing objective adjusted.
In the very short run, this mix depends on the
degree of confidence the manager places in
daily reserve projections relative to signals from
the funds market as competing guides to the
sign and size of needed open market operations
during a reserve maintenance period. During an
intermeeting period, a shift in the borrowing/
funds rate relationship might place the manager
in the awkward position of having to choose
between the FOMC's specified borrowing objec-
tive and intended funds rate as the relevant meas-
ure of reserve restraint to be achieved through
open market operations. Clarification from the
FOMC might be needed to avoid a misunder-
standing about the manager's stewardship in car-
rying out the policy directive.
Uncertainty about the reliability of the
borrowing/funds rate relationship also could add
an extra layer of complexity to FOMC delibera-
tions. Members who already must reconcile their
individual policy predilections into a single policy
directive also would have to reconcile their indi-
vidual views about the relative merits of risking
unexpected changes either in the funds rate or in
borrowing when instructing the manager. More-
over, in the markets, policy signals also would
become less clear under these circumstances,
reflecting market uncertainty about whether the
• 19 Thornton (1988) provides a useful examination of these alternative
operating procedure matters.
• 20 A second possible advantage might be that a borrowed reserve
objective leaves the federal funds rate implication of monetary policy decisions
slightly ambiguous in the very short run. This has the disadvantage that
market observers cannot distinguish immediately between funds rate changes
intended by policy and changes induced by market pressures. However, this
ambiguity might facilitate reaching a consensus when monetary policy deci-
sions are made infrequently (FOMC meetings typically are scheduled six to
eight weeks apart) and are contingent on forecasts of near-term economic
developments. Members may agree on a course of action more readily if the
implication of their action includes slightly different funds rate preferences or
somewhat different anticipations for the economy by various members.
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a. Diminished focus on borrowing objective in supplying nonborrowed
reserves.
b. Change in borrowing objective to reflect change in willingness to borrow.
c. Explicitly attributed to seasonal borrowing.
SOURCE: Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee.
observed level of borrowing or of the funds rate
represented the intention of policy.
2
1
Responding to Shifts in
Borrowing Demand
Open market operations today are conducted
within a policy milieu that perceives a lasting
change in the federal funds rate of about 25
basis points as evidence of a meaningful change
in reserve restraint. In recent years, a $100 mil-
lion (or perhaps smaller) change in the target
for adjustment plus seasonal borrowing normally
would have been expected to produce such a
• 21 There was a time when the FOMC was willing to accept a federal
funds rate outcome between meetings within a range of several hundred basis
points without reconvening for further deliberation. However, this was in the
period of strict monetary targeting between late 1979 and late 1982, when
open market operations were guided by yet a third method, with a nonbor-
rowed reserve policy objective. Under that procedure, however, the 400-basis-
point range was not the deviation from the expected funds rate acceptable in
setting reserve restraint. Rather, 400 basis points was the range within which
the FOMC was willing to allow the reserve restraint setting itself to vary in
response to monetary growth.
change in the rate spread. On that basis, a shift
in the demand for borrowed reserves on the
order of $100 million, unless offset by a compa-
rable change in the borrowing objective, might
be mistaken in markets for a change in policy.
Unexpected shifts in the borrowing/funds rate
relationship have occurred in the past, although
they were not necessarily related to the seasonal
borrowing program. A temporary reduction in
willingness to borrow was observed during the
summer of 1984, in apparent reaction to prob-
lems at the Continental Illinois Bank. In early
1986 and again in late 1987, apparently perma-
nent changes in the demand for discount-
window credit were observed. In each case, the
estimated magnitude of the shift was substantial
in the sense that, had the shift not been offset by
adjusting the target for borrowing, the potential
change in the funds rate would likely have been
interpreted as a change in policy.
Between the October 1988 and February 1990
meetings, the record of FOMC policy actions
frequently noted apparent or potential shifts in
the borrowing/funds rate relationship. These
shifts were, in part, associated with the seasonal
borrowing program (table 2). As shown in figure
2, the decline in adjustment plus seasonal bor-
rowing from late summer 1988 to early spring
1989, despite an increase of 100 basis points in
the rate spread, suggests the magnitude of the
shift in the borrowing function that the Commit-
tee offset. While adjustment borrowing rose,
consistent with a larger rate spread, seasonal bor-
rowing declined by more than enough to offset
that increase.
The same may be said of the increase in adjust-
ment plus seasonal borrowing after spring 1989,
despite a 70-basis-point decrease in the rate
spread. While adjustment borrowing fell, con-
sistent with a reduced rate spread, seasonal bor-
rowing increased by more than enough to offset
that decline. It was not the seasonality of pro-
gram borrowing that was a problem, but the
unexpected amplitude of the seasonality in con-
junction with low levels of adjustment borrow-
ing that, if not offset, might have produced a
noticeable deviation of the funds rate from its
intended setting.
The onset of this extended episode was noted
in a November 1988 Committee conference call
when "...it became increasingly evident in the
implementation of policy that depository institu-
tions had reduced their demands on the discount
window..." and the System Open Market Account
manager "...adjusted the reserve paths to incor-
porate a lower level of borrowing...." The Com-
mittee "...agreed that the factors relating to the
apparent change in the relationship between
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borrowing and the federal funds rate, and the
broader implications for the conduct of open
market operations, would be reviewed further at
the December meeting." The December record
indicated that "...the procedure of focusing on
the degree of reserve restraint, as indexed by
borrowed reserves, had been implemented with
some flexibility in recent weeks in light of the
substantial shortfall of borrowing in relation to
expectations."
After discussion at the December meeting,
"...[the] Committee concluded that no changes
in the current procedure were needed at [that]
time, but that flexibility would remain important
in accomplishing Committee objectives under
changing circumstances." At each of its next
three meetings, in February, March, and May of
1989, it was "understood" or "accepted" that
open market operations would be conducted
with "flexibility" in the light of "uncertainties" in
the borrowing/funds rate relationship.
By May, the reduced demands on the discount
window appeared to be passing, "...largely
because of a surge in seasonal borrowing—and,
according to a staff analysis, unchanged reserve
conditions over the upcoming intermeeting
period might encompass somewhat higher aver-
age borrowing." For the remainder of 1989,
"flexibility" in response to "uncertainty" was
succeeded by "technical upward revisions" (July
and August meeting records) and then "technical
reductions" (November and December meeting
records) in the level of adjustment plus seasonal
borrowing used in setting reserve objectives for
open market operations. These adjustments to the
index of reserve restraint reflected "unusual
strength/strength" and then "a decline/a continu-
ing decline" in seasonal borrowing.
Flexibility in policy implementation can be
achieved because daily decisions about open
market operations can reflect a mixed strategy.
Daily estimates of the demand for total reserves
relative to the estimated actual supply of nonbor-
rowed reserves suggest the amount of open mar-
ket operations needed to achieve a borrowed
reserve objective for a reserve maintenance
period. However, inconsistent behavior of the
federal funds rate may suggest the possibility of
errors in estimates of reserve demand or supply,
or in the estimated borrowing/funds rate rela-
tionship, and can lead to open market opera-
tions being shaded accordingly. Conceptually, a
pure borrowed-reserve objective would have no
such contingency for using funds-rate informa-
tion. The degree of flexibility in implementation
might be judged by the extent to which the
funds rate diverges from its expected level with-
out triggering open market operations that are
not strictly consistent with reserve estimates.
The complicating factors for monetary policy
associated with the seasonal borrowing program
are the need for flexibility in policy implementa-
tion and for technical changes in the borrowing
objective. Complicating policy implementation is
not the same as thwarting policy implementation.
The Committee can and apparently did achieve
intended levels of the federal funds rate despite
uncertainty about, and shifts in, the borrowing/
funds rate relationship, which emanated in part
from the seasonal borrowing program. Compli-
cating policy implementation simply avoids a
disadvantage of the borrowed reserve procedure
— unintended changes in the federal funds rate
occurring as a result of changes in the
borrowing/funds rate relationship. At the same
time, however, complicating monetary policy
may mean losing the advantage of the borrowed
reserve procedure—rapid response of the funds
rate to changing market perceptions of underly-
ing demands for money and credit.
Nothing need be lost if the borrowing objec-
tive requires only frequent technical changes to
incorporate a predictable seasonal pattern of sea-
sonal borrowing. In fact, if the seasonal process
could be predicted with sufficient accuracy, the
borrowed reserve index of reserve restraint
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levels. This would avoid any potential confusion
between technical and policy changes in the
index of reserve restraint. Other than that step,
the borrowed reserve procedure could operate
unchanged, allowing changing market percep-
tions of basic money and credit demand to feed
into the funds rate in the very short run.
Of course, it may not be possible to predict the
seasonal process with such reliability. The less
predictable the seasonal changes in seasonal
borrowing, the more difficult it must become to
estimate the short-term technical changes
required to avoid inadvertent policy changes in
the borrowed reserve index of reserve restraint.
In the past, when the level and amplitude of sea-
sonal movements in seasonal borrowing were
small relative to adjustment borrowing, this
problem appears to have been eclipsed or offset
by movements in adjustment borrowing. Now,
flexibility becomes more important in achieving
the intended funds rate when uncertainty
obscures the expected level of seasonal borrow-
ing. What is lost is simply the possibility of a
response of the funds rate in the very short run
to changing market perceptions of underlying
demands for money and credit.
Upon closer inspection, this seeming loss
actually may be a gain. Seasonal borrowing has
become a substantially larger, frequently domi-
nant, share of total adjustment plus seasonal bor-
rowing used as the guide for open market opera-
tions. Without flexibility, the danger is that the
funds rate would be responding in the very short
run largely to unexpected changes in underlying
demands for credit in the agricultural sector of
the economy. The rationale for the seasonal bor-
rowing program is that eligible borrowers are
thought to have limited access to the financial
markets that other institutions use. To the extent
that agricultural credit conditions were not
representative of those in the economy at large,
the Committee would not want to allow changes
in seasonal borrowing originating in the agricul-
tural sector to show through in short-run move-
ments in the federal funds rate.
cally available to borrowers. Evolution of finan-
cial market structure since the program began in
1973 should have had the effect of reducing
market isolation of eligible banks, weakening
limited access as the rationale for the program.
Light usage and reduced isolation suggest that
the need for the program may be confined to a
relatively small number of banks for which the
original program rationale may still apply.
Rapid growth of peak-period seasonal borrow-
ing in recent years is said to have complicated
monetary policy implementation, contrary to
expectations that existed when the program was
introduced. These complications have arisen
because the FOMC has been using a borrowed
reserve procedure to guide open market opera-
tions since 1982. Technical changes in the
Committee's borrowing objective can prevent
unintended movements of the funds rate when
there are predictable swings in seasonal borrow-
ing over the course of a year. Similarly, flexibility
in pursuing a borrowing objective can prevent
unintended rate movements to the extent that
seasonal borrowing cannot be predicted reliably.
Flexibility allows the FOMC to achieve an
intended level of the federal funds rate when the
appropriate borrowed reserve objective is hard
to predict. In so doing, flexibility removes the
borrowed reserve procedure's advantage of
allowing the funds rate to be immediately
responsive to changes in market perceptions of
the underlying demand for money and credit.
This seems entirely appropriate when borrowing
is dominated by the seasonal borrowing of
small, largely agricultural banks with limited
access to financial markets.
IV. Conclusion
The Federal Reserve's seasonal borrowing pro-
gram was designed for small banks with marked
seasonal needs for funds and was intended to
remedy their presumed limited access to finan-
cial markets upon which larger banks relied for
liquidity. Use of the program has been light rela-
tive to the number of banks likely to be eligible,




Holland, Robert C, and George Garvy. The
Redesigned Discount Mechanism and the
Money Market," in Reappraisal of the Federal
Reserve Discount Mechanism, Washington,
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, vol. 3, June 1972, pp. 183-97.
Kane, Edward J. "All for the Best: The Federal
Reserve Board's 60th Annual Report," Ameri-
can Economic Review, vol. 64, no. 4
(December 1974), pp. 835-50.
Melichar, Emanuel. "Toward a Seasonal Borrow-
ing Privilege: A Study of Intrayear Fund Flows
at Commercial Banks," in Reappraisal of the
Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism,
Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, vol. 2, December
1971, pp. 93-106.
. "The Federal Reserve Seasonal Bor-
rowing Privilege," in Future Sources of Loan-
able Funds for Agricultural Banks, a sympo-
sium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City, December 8-9, 1980, pp.
111-32.
, and Raymond J. Doll. "Capital and
Credit Requirements of Agriculture and Pro-
posals to Increase Availability of Bank Credit,"
in Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount
Mechanism, Washington, D.C.: Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, vol. 2,
December 1971, pp. 107-73.
Modigliani, Franco. "Some Proposals for a
Reform of the Discount Window," in Reap-
praisal of the Federal Reserve Discount Mech-
anism, Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, vol. 2,
December 1971, pp. 59-76.
Thornton, Daniel L "The Borrowed-Reserves
Operating Procedure: Theory and Evidence,"
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol.
70, no. 1 (January/February 1988), pp. 30-54.
Timenes, Virginia, and Emanuel Melichar. "Sea
sonal Borrowing Privilege: A New Dimension
in Administration of the Federal Reserve Dis-
count Window," mimeo reprinted from Pro-
ceedings of the Business and Economic Statis-
tics Section, Washington, D.C.: American
Statistical Association, 1973, pp. 605-10.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1990 Q 2
Best available copy